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Abstract
The written text is a social situation. That is to say, it has its existence in something more than the marks
on the page, namely the participations of social beings whom we call writers and readers, and who
constitute the writing as communication of a particular kind, as 'saying' a certain thing. Just as the
sociologist attempts to uncover structures and regularities in social situations, so it is assumed that the
meaning of writing is an a prion to be uncovered existing either as a function of the language, or the
inscription of something in the mind of the writer, or the reconstruction of the reader's experience.
Constitutive Graphonomy, the constitutive ethnography of writing systems, is concerned to examine the
objective meanings of writing as social accomplishments of these participants. This is because meaning
is a social fact which comes to being within the discourse of a culture, and social facts as well as social
structures are themselves social accomplishments.
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W.D. ASHCROFT

Constitutive Graphonomy: A PostColonial Theory of Literary Writing
The written text is a social situation. That is to say, it has its existence in
something more than the marks on the page, namely the participations of
social beings whom we call writers and readers, and who constitute the
writing as communication of a particular kind, as 'saying' a certain thing.
Just as the sociologist attempts to uncover structures and regularities in
social situations, so it is assumed that the meaning of writing is an a prion to
be uncovered existing either as a function of the language, or the inscription
of something in the mind of the writer, or the reconstruction of the reader's
experience. Constitutive Graphonomy, the constitutive ethnography of
writing systems, is concerned to examine the objective meanings of writing
as social accomplishments of these participants. This is because meaning is
a social fact which comes to being within the discourse of a culture, and social
facts as well as social structures are themselves social accomplishments.
Constitutive Graphonomy is a post-colonial literary theory. It can be
described as such for several reasons: it affirms the fact that a literary theory
is a cultural formation; it resists the reification of the art form out of its social
and cultural provenance; it confirms the text as originating in material
practice at a dual site of production and consumption; it contributes to a
dismantling of our nominal and largely unexamined assumptions of literary
definition, reassessing what kinds of writing Tit' or could be considered to
fit into the category 'literature'; it questions the assumptions of the process
of ascribing merit through critical practice. But above all it focuses the
meaning event within the usage of social actors who present themselves to
each other as functions in the text, and by its privileging of cultural distance
at the site of this usage it resolves the conflict between language, reader and
writer over the 'ownership' of meaning. These characteristics do not
represent an 'essential' feature of post-colonial theory, nor are they
necessarily exclusive to it. Rather they are individual and overlapping
features of this particular discursive formation.
Clearly the notion of the text as dialectical accomplishment requires some
clarification, since our assumption of the givenness of texts is supported at
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Clearly the notion of the text as dialectical accomplishment requires some
clarification, since our assumption of the givenness of texts is supported at
the very least by the evidence of their physical tangibility. To the question,
'How do you mean?', we could say that the meaning of a word is meant by the
person who utters it and is taken to mean something by the person who hears
it. As a radical over-simplification of the history of European literary theory
we could say that such history has been an arena in which all of these
participants - the language, the utterer or writer, and the hearer or reader
- have been locked in a gladitorial contest over the ownership of meaning.
But on closer examination it can be seen that all three 'functions' of this
exchange participate in the 'social' situation of the written text. The constant
insistence of that discourse which operates through hybridity and
marginality is that writing is a social practice. There is simply no room in
post-colonial literature for a reified art that 'exists for its own sake'.
Admittedly, the political impetus of post-colonial theory has been to focus
meaning at the site of production. But such theory is in a unique position to
resolve some of the lingering questions of European theory because it exists
in a permanent and creative tension with the metropolitan centre and its
privileging of standard code, intrinsic value and veridical truth.
Meaning is a social accomplishment characterised by the participation of
the writer and reader 'functions' within the 'event' of the particular
discourse. Meaning may thus be called a 'situated accomplishment' - a term
which takes into account the necessary presence of these functions and the
situation in which the meaning occurs. It is easy to see the understanding
reached in conversation as a 'situated accomplishment', for the face-to-face
interaction enables a virtually limitless adjustment to the flow of talk. The
central feature of such activity is presence, the presence of the speaker and
the hearer to each other constituting language as communication. Yet even
in the most empathetic exchange the speaker and hearer are never fully
present to one another. The experience of one conversant can never become
the experience of the other: the 'mind' is a retrospective and largely
hypothetical concomitant to what is 'revealed' in language. Meaning and
understanding of meaning can occur because the language encodes the
reciprocity of the experiences of each conversant. It is the situation, the
'event' of this reciprocal happening which 'tells', which 'refers', which
'informs'.
The example of conversation alerts us to the extent and the limitation of
the structuring activities of individuals in any social situation. No person is
a totally free agent, for that would be to deny the effects of society, culture,
and history upon the individual and the situation in which s/he is acting. But
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rather than upcm the participating individuals. And though these individuals
can direct or unleash the potentialities of the antecedents, affecting the
situation, they cannot change them. The apparently simple example of a
casual conversation clearly demonstrates the complex array of structuring
participations in the social event. But it is the 'event', the situation of its
structure and structuring participations rather than the contingent
intentions or psychological sates of speakers, which imparts a direction and
a meaning to the conversation.
The discursive 'event', the site of the 'communication', therefore becomes
of paramount importance in post-colonial literatures because the
'participants' are potentially so very 'absent'. Indeed, unlike spoken
discourse, the central problematic of studies of writing is absence. It is not so
easy to see the written meaning as the 'situated accomplishment' of
participants because the message 'event' occupies the apparent social fissure
between the acts of writing and reading, the discursive space in which writer
and reader as social actors never meet. Whether the writing is a newspaper
article, instructions for the assembly of a model aeroplane, or a philosophical
treatise, the writer and reader have access to each other only through the
mutual construction of the text within certain linguistic and generic
parameters. That distance between minds, which seems to be compensated
for in the spoken conversation by the situation of the dialogue, would appear
to elude writing. The written text stands apart in its own material integrity,
apparently unrelated to persons, to language or to social systems in any
purely mechanical or isomorphic way, but grounded in the semiotic systems
by which such persons and systems are imputed. How meaning is
constructed in the writing by its absentee users becomes a central question
in writing studies and is made much more salient by post-colonial writing
systems in which writer and reader might have ranges of experience and
presuppositions which may not be expected to overlap greatly, if at all. The
additional perspective which the consideration of post-colonial literatures
brings to this discussion is obviously their accentuation of this phenomenon
oidistance: they present us with writers and readers far more 'absent' from
each other than they would be if located in the same culture; they present
a situation which in some cases (because the genre of written prose is so
removed from some cultures) provides a totally ambivalent site for
communication. One qualification to this may be that the sharing of an
imperial system of education and cultural patronage, issuing forth in the
widespread uniformity of curriculae, readers, and other cultural 'guides'
used throughout Britain's empire, considerably ameliorates this distancing
within the post-colonial world. But even in the monoglossic settler cultures
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used throughout Britain's empire, considerably ameliorates this distancing
within the post-colonial world. But even in the monoglossic settler cultures
the sub-cultural distancing which generates the evolution of variant
language shows that the linguistic cultures encompassed by the term
'English' are vastly heterogeneous. Most importantly, post-colonial
literatures provide, through the métonymie function of language variance,
a writing which actually installs distance and absence in the interstices of the
text.
The face-to-face situation of spoken discourse is replaced by the
distanciation of the writing system, a distance which frees the meaning from
the constraints of speech and creates a vehicle which at once confirms and
bridges the absence of writers and readers. As writing, the message event is
not merely a different physical mode, but a different ontological event.
Derrida claims that:
Inscription alone ... has the power to arouse speech from its slumber as sign. By
enregistering speech, inscription has as its essential objective ... the emancipation of
meaning ... from the natural predicament in which everything refers to the
disposition of a contingent situation. This is why writing will never be simple 'voice
painting' (Voltaire). It creates meaning by enregistering it, by entrusting it to an
engraving, a groove, a relief, to a surfece whose essential characteristic is to be
infinitely transmissible.^

By freeing language from the contingent situation, writing, paradoxically,
gives language its greatest permanence, whilst, at the same time, giving
meaning its greatest volatility, because it opens up horizons within which
many more sets of relations then those pertaining to the contingent situation
can be established. Writing does not merely inscribe the spoken message or
represent the message event, it becomes the new event. Nor is it merely the
inscription of thought without the medium of speech, for such thought is
only accessible as a putative associate of the event. Post-colonial literature
reveals this most clearly when its appropriation of English, far from
inscribing either vernacular or 'standard' forms, creates a new discourse at
their interface. Post-colonial writing represents neither speech nor local
reality but constructs a discourse which may intimate them. This distinction
ought to be made as clearly as possible. While writing is a new ontological
event it does not cut itself off from the voice. The inscription of the
vernacular modality of local speech is one of the strategies by which a
marginal' linguistic culture appropriates the imported language to its own
conceptions of society and place. This discourse also questions the Derridian
conclusion that writing is infinitely transmissable and hence infinitely
interpretable. Infinite transmissability assumes a totally homogeneous
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subsumes all writing into a universalist paradigm which is essentially that of
the metropolitan centre.
The danger exists that within this universalist paradigm writing may
become reified. In fact, this problem begins with structuralist linguistics,
which tends to reify the linguistic code. In Saussure's distinction between
langue and parole, langiie is the code or set of codes on the basis of which a
speaker produces parole, a particular message.^ While langue, the description
of the synchronic systems of language, is the object of linguistics, the parole,
the language in use, the intentional message, focuses a study of language on
its actual operation. 'Hoyjparole is precisely what Saussure's Course in General
Linguistics (1916) is not about, and ever since its publication, linguistics, the
handmaiden of structuralism, has bracketed the message in order to
concentrate on the code, in which it is primarily interested.
A post-colonial approach to linguistics, however, redresses this imbalance
by focusing on the message, reinstating the parole as the realisation of the
code in social life. This has the consequence of re-establishing the 'margins'
of language as the substance of theory. This reassertion of the margins of
language use over the dominance of a standard code, a centre, is the most
exciting conclusion of the theory of the 'creóle continuum'.^ But it is also
instrumental in conceiving the discourse of the post-colonial as rooted in
conflict and struggle, as 'counter-discourse',^ since the perpetual
confrontation with a 'standard code' is that which constructs the language.
This does not mean the replacement of one canon for another, or the
reconstruction of the centre which is being subverted. Such a re-orientation
emphasises the fact that the code is abstracted from the activity, and
re-installs the priority of the practical or constitutive semiology of the
message. This observation reveals that language has its only practical
existence in the parole within which the usage of members, rather than a
supervenient system or a priori referentiallity, determines meanings. This
becomes particularly true of english in which the notion of a standard 'code'
is dismantled by the continuum of practices by which the language is
constituted.
This constitutive semiology radically modifies the most fundamental
tenets of Saussurian theory, namely;
(a) That in semiotic system there are differences but no substantial existence. No entity
belonging to the structure of the system has a meaning of its own; the meaning of a
word, for example, results from the opposition to the other lexical units of the same
system.
(b) That all systems are closed, without relation to external, non-semiotic reality.^
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While it is certainly true that meaning is not necessarily determined by
the external relation of a sign and a thing, meaning is determined within
the relations aaualised within the message rather than those purely
abstracted in the system. In short, language is a social medium for
individuals rather than a self sufficient system of inner relationships. Though
it does not determine meaning ostensively, it is a social act within which
reality is determined. Consequently, the message event marks the terrain of
meaning for the written work, for only the message event gives currency to
language within the relations of social beings. Neither the mental lives of
speakers and writers nor the objects of their talk can usurp this fundamental
concern.
Constitutive Graphonomy reassesses traditional approaches to meaning
such as those in speech act theory.® While we can inscribe the propositional
content of a speech act we cannot, for instance, inscribe its illocutionary
force. Such force is carried in the situation of the message. Both the
illocutionary and perlocutionary force of the sign THIS WAY are embodied
entirely in its character as sign and the social conventions surrounding its
role. Similar conventions surround and determine the forms of different
kinds of writing, particularly those given the designation 'literary'. The
illocutionary force of these texts similarly cannot be conveyed by means of
grammar, italics, and punctuation, but rather is actualised constitutively in
the conventional practice - the situation - of the reading. The writing 'event'
thus becomes the centre of the accomplishment of meaning, for it is here
that the system, the social world of its users, and the absent 'participants'
themselves, intersect.
The post-colonial affirms the orientation of writing to the message event.
The immense 'distance' between author and reader in the cross-cultural or
sub-cultural text undermines the privilege of both subject and object and
opens meaning to a relational dialectic which 'emancipates' it.^ This
emancipation, however, is limited by the 'absence' which is inscribed in the
cross-cultural text, the gulf of silence installed by strategies of language
variance which signify its difference. Inscription therefore does not 'create
meaning' by enregistering it; it initiates meaning to a horizon of relationships cirsumscribed by that silence which ultimately cannot be traversed by
an interpretation. It is this silence, the active assertion of the post-colonial
text, rather than any culture-specific concept of meaning, which questions
metropolitan notions of polysemity and resists the absorption of post-colonial
literature into the universalist paradigm. We can thus see how important is
the cross-cultural literary text in questions of meaning. Nothing better
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describes to us the distance traversed in the social engagement which occurs
when authors write and readers read. But it is clear that the distances are
traversed. Writing comes into being at the intersection of the sites of
production and consumption. Although the 'social relationship' of the two
absent subjects is actually a function of their access to the 'situation' of the
writing, it is in this threefold interaction of situation, author function, and
reader function that meaning is accomplished.

LANGUAGE
We may now examine more closely the contending claims in the struggle
for the dominance of meaning. The first of these is language, which is
commonly held to embody or contain meaning either by direct
representation or, in a more subtle way, by determining the perception of
the world. Constitutive Graphonomy raises the question of language to
prominence because language that exists in complexity, hybridity and
constant change inevitably rejects the assumption of a linguistic structure or
code which can be characterised by the colonial distinction of'standard' and
'variant'. All language is 'marginal'; all language emerges out of conflict and
struggle. The post-colonial text brings language and meaning to a discursive
site in which they are mutually constituted, and at this site the importance
of usage is inescapable.
Although the view is rarely expressed by anyone conversant with
languages in different cultures that language 'represents' or 'reflects' an
autonomous reality, it is probably the most ubiquitous Western assumption
about the operation of language because our sense of how words mean
operates within a discourse in which the world (the object) is irremediably
separated from the speaker (the subject). The Lockian separation of subject
and object, the separation of the consciousness from the world of which it is
conscious, is the schema which still underlies the modern Western episteme
with its passion for 'scientific' objectivity and its tendency to see the world as
a continuum of technological data. Such a view is possibly the most crucial
factor separating Western society from those societies in which much
(though not all) post-colonial literature is generated. The view of language
which this schema installs is best represented by the theories of 'reference'
which dominated Anglo-empiricism in the earlier part of this century, but
which still hold sway in most empirical philosophies. According to this view
words have referents in the real world, and what a word refers to is, for all
intents and purposes, what it means.

64

But words are never so simply referential in the actual dynamic habits of
a speaking community. Even the most simple words like 'hot', 'big', 'man',
'got', 'ball', and 'bat', have a number of meanings, depending on how they
are used. Indeed, these uses are the ways (and therefore what) the word
means in certain circumstances. A word such as 'bat' can operate as a noun
with several referents or as a verb describing several kinds of action. Many
other words, such as 'bush' (which has found hundreds of uses in
post-colonial societies), reveal that the meaning of words is also inextricably
tied to the discourse of place. Post-colonial literature has continually shown
both the importance of this discourse and the inescapable linking of meaning
to the usage within the event. In his novel The Voice Gabriel Okara
demonstrates the almost limitless prolixity of the words 'inside' and 'insides'
to describe the whole range of human volition, experience, emotion and
thought.^ Brought to the site of meaning which stands at the intersection
between two separate cultures, the word demonstrates the total dependence
of that meaning upon its 'situated-ness'.
Language cannot, therefore, be said to perform its hermeneutic function
by reflecting or referring to the world in a purely contingent way, and thus
meanings cannot remain exclusively accessible to those speakers who
'experience their referents', so to speak. The central feature of the ways in
which words mean things in spoken or written discourse is the situation of
the word. In general, one may see how the word is meant by the way it
functions in the sentence, but the meaning of a word may require
considerably more than a sentence for it to be adequately situated. The
question remains whether it is the responsibility of the author in the
cross-cultural text to employ techniques which more promptly 'situate' the
word or phrase for the reader. While post-colonial writing has led to a
profusion of technical innovation which exists to span the purported gap
between writer and prospective reader, the process of reading itself is a
continual process of contextualisation and adjustment directly linked to the
constitutive relations within the discursive event.
An alternative, determinist view which proposes that language actually
constructs that which is perceived and experienced by speakers is less
problematic for post-colonial literature. Edward Sapir proposed the exciting
and revolutionary view that what we call the 'real' world is built up by the
language habits of a group, and that the worlds in which different societies
live are quite distinct, not merely the same world with different labels
attached.® The central idea of Whorf and Sapir's thesis is well known. It
proposes that language functions not simply as a device for reporting
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experience, but also, and m o r e significantly, as a way of defining experience
of its speakers:
... the linguistic system (in other words, the grammar) of each language is not merely
a reproducing instrument for voicing ideas but rather is itself the shaper of ideas, the
program and guide for the individual's mental activity, for his analysis of impressions,
for his synthesis of his mental stock in trade ... We dissect nature along the line laid
down for us by our native languages. The categories and types that we isolate from
the world of phenomena we do not find there because they stare every observer in
the face; on the contrary, the world is presented in a kaleidoscopic flux of impressions
which has to be organised in our minds - and this means by the linguistic system in
our minds. ^ ®

But even this m o r e attractive view of the link between l a n g u a g e and the
world may give rise to a n u m b e r of objections f r o m constitutive theory.
Clearly, language offers o n e set of categories and not a n o t h e r for speakers
to organise and describe experience, but to assume that language creates
meanings in the minds of speakers misconceives the way in which meaning
is constituted in discourse. While it is quite clear that language is m o r e than
a 'reproducing i n s t r u m e n t for voicing ideas' (for what do t h o u g h t s or ideas
look like apart from their expression in language?), t h e s a m e objections can
be applied to the idea of language as t h e 'shaper' or ' p r o g r a m m e r ' of ideas.
Such ideas are still inaccessible apart from language. T o possess a language
is to possess a technique, not necessarily a q u a n t u m of knowledge about the
world; and therefore it is tautological to say that o n e speaker 'sees' the world
in the same way as a n o t h e r because they share a technique for putting
certain rules into practice - the 'seeing' is e m b e d d e d in t h e practice. T o speak
of language as 'shaping' ideas also logically leads to t h e identification of one
particular 'shaping' with a particular language, or m o r e commonly, with the
use of language in a particular place. This sort of identification leaves itself
no conceptual room to cope with the p h e n o m e n o n of second language use
or vernacular linguistic variance, for it is only in the most metaphorical sense
that we can talk about a speaker 'seeing' a different world w h e n s/he speaks
in a second language.
But it is the situation of discourse r a t h e r t h a n t h e linguistic system in the
speaker's mind in which the 'obligatory terms' of language a r e structured.
For instance, W h o r f s discovery that Inuit languages have a variety of words
for 'snow', thus suggesting they see t h e world differently f r o m non-Inuits,
overlooks the fact that skiers of all languages have a similar variety of words
for snow, but could hardly be said to see the world differently in t h e way
Whorf means. T h e m e a n i n g and n a t u r e of perceived reality a r e not
determined within the minds of the users, n o r even within the language
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itself, but within the use, within the multiplicity of relationships which
operate in the system. Margaret Atwood makes an interesting reference to
a North American Indian language which has no noun-forms, only verbforms. In such a linguistic culture the experience of the world remains in
continual process. Such a language cannot exist if language is either anterior
or posterior to the world but reinforces the notion that language inhabits
the world, in practice. The semantic component of the sentence is contained
in the syntax: the meaning of a word or phrase is its use in the language, a
use which has nothing to do with the kind of world a user 'has in his or her
head'.
What the speaker 'has in mind', like a linguistic system or culture, or
intentions or meanings, is only accessible in the 'retrospective' performance
of speaking. The categories which language offers to describe the world are
easily mistaken to shape something in the mind because we naturally assume
that, like the rules of chess, we hold the linguistic system 'in our minds', in
advance of the world. But language is co-extensive with social reality, not
because it causes a certain perception of the world, but because it is
inextricable from that perception.
Languages exist, therefore, neither before the fact nor after the fact but
in the fact. Languages constitute reality in an obvious way: they provide some
terms and not others with which to talk about the world. Because they
provide a limited lexicon they may also be said (metaphorically) to 'use' the
speaker, rather than vice versa. But the worlds constituted in this way do
not become fixed composites in the speaker's mind, a set of images which
differs, by definition, from the set in the mind of the speaker of a different
language. Worlds exist by means of languages, their horizons extending as
far as the processes of neologism, innovation, tropes and imagination will
allow the horizons of the language itself to be extended.

THE READER FUNCTION IN THE WRITING
If the written text is a social situation, the post-colonial text emphasises the
central problem of this situation, the 'absence' of those 'functions' in the text
which operate to constitute the discursive event as communication: the
'writer' and 'reader'. The author function, with its vision and intentions, its
'gifted creative insight', has historically exerted the strongest claim upon the
meaning of writing. But the concept of the author is quite alien to many
post-colonial cultures and, as Eoucault has pointed out, is really a quite
recent phenomenon in European culture. The need to ground discourse in
an originating subject was the reason to accord it the status of a possession,
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Speeches and books were assigned real authors only when someone had to
be made responsible for them as possessions and therefore subject to
punishment, first for transgressing religious rules and later for transgressing
or affirming the rules of property ownership.^ ^ To attain this social and legal
status the meaning had to be a product attributable to a subject.
Consequently, the immense and complex forces of which the text was a
product could be conveniently located in an originating mind.
This should assist us to find some balance in assessing the author's place
in the 'production' of the text. We have made an important start by rejecting
the notion that meaning is a mental act, a sort of picture which the author
translates into words or vice versa. But how does the non-English speaker,
for instance, mean anything in English? Firstly, the writer, like the language,
is subject to the situation, in that s/he must say something meanahle. This does
not mean s/he cannot alter the language, and use it neologistically and
creatively; it does mean, however, that the writer becomes limited, as any
speaker is limited, to a situation in which words have meaning. In literature
the 'situation' refers to something of extremely wide range. It is, at its
simplest, the place of the word within a meanable context, the grammar or
rules which make the context meanable, but it is also a continuously
unfolding horizon which ever more finely articulates the meaning. (From
the reader's point of view it is important to realise that the 'situation' extends
beyond the text.) Literature, and particularly narrative, has the capacity to
domesticate even the most alien experience. It does not need to reproduce
the experience to construct the meaning. Thus although there is no word
in English which has the associations of mana (oneness with the world) in
Polynesian or Tjukurrpa (the 'Dreaming') in Pintjantjatjara, there is no
insurmountable conceptual difficulty in articulating their associations.
One could go further than this to say that the author is subject not only
to the situation of discourse but to the reader as well. The reader is present,
as 2i function, in the writing of the text. Thus the relationship between these
social forces and the text is the same as that between the linguistic system
and the 'text' of a particular world view: neither causal nor representative,
but co-extensive. The crucial assertion of Constitutive Graphonomy is that
within the framework of these social antecedents, the writer and reader
functions are as 'present' to each other in the acts of writing and reading as
conversants are in conversation. The reader may be present in the writing
at a conscious level, in the author's sense of an audience, of a purpose for
writing, but it is not necessarily so specific. To detect the presence of the
reader function in the writing let us first think clearly whether the act of
writing can ever exclude the simultaneous act of reading. That moment of
68

as Sartre says, the others 'were already present in the heart of the word,
hearers and speakers awaiting their turn'.^^ The requirement of meanability
itself implicates the reader function. The space within which the writer meets
the reading other is neither one culture nor another, neither one language
nor another, but
parole, the situation of discourse
THE WRITER FUNCTION IN THE READING
Just as the reader writes' the text because s/he takes it to mean something,
and just as the reader function is present in the writing as the focus of its
meanability, so the author is present in the reading. Again, this is firstly true
at a conscious level, where the reader accepts the convention that the author
is telling him or her something in the text. S/he responds to the text as
'telling' him or her something because such ways of using language as this
literary text represents come within the rules for the activity of'telling'. But
one cannot 'tell' others anything that they do not incorporate or 'tell'
themselves. The mind is active in knowing. Whether in a child learning a
language or in a scientist 'observing' an 'objective' universe, knowing is
conducted within the situation of horizons of expectations and other
knowledge. In reading, a horizon of expectations is partly established by the
unfolding text, while a relevant horizon of other knowledge (actually other
texts) is established by exploration.
The reader constructs the other dialogic pole of discourse because
speaking is a social act. But the reader does not simply respond to the
convention of the authoring other; s/he responds to the 'intentionality' of
the work itself, quite apart from any imputation of an author. The work is
a way of seeing and responding, a way of directing attention to that which
is 'given to consciousness'. It is more accurate to say that the reader sees
'according to' or 'with' the text rather than sees 'it'. This orientation to the
intentionality of the text occurs whether there is an actual author or not.^^
We can deduce from this that the intentionality of the text can hcpvi for the
direction of the author's consciousness. Thus interpretation is never
univocal, but the reader is subject to the situation, to the rules of discourse,
and to the directing other, as the author is subject to them.
As with language, our natural assumption about understanding is that it
must be a discrete experience, that when we 'understand' there must be
characteristic experiences of understanding which have corresponding
identifiable mental correlates. Otherwise how could we 'understand' a writer
(even one writing in a common language) who has a profoundly different
experience of the world? But we can test this assumption that understanding
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identifiable mental correlates. Otherwise how could we 'understand' a writer
(even one writing in a common language) who has a profoundly different
experience of the world? But we can test this assumption that understanding
is an identifiable experience. Take the example of a bricklayer who uses the
term 'Brick!' as an elliptical form of the phrase 'Pass me a brick'. Neither
the bricklayer nor the person to whom s/he is talking needs to translate the
word 'Brick!' into the phrase every time it is used in order to understand it.
The word operates perfectly well as a communication within the exchange
and it is its use and the continuation of the job which locates the
understanding of the word 'Brick' as an order. The same process applies
when English variants, neologisms and borrowings are situated in the
written English text. As with most words there may be many possible uses
but it is the use in this situation which locates the meaning. Gabriel Okara's
use of'inside' and 'insides' is an obvious case in point.
The processes of understanding are therefore not limited to the minds of
speakers of one mother tongue and denied the speakers of another. Meaning
and the understanding of meaning exist outside the mind, within the
engagement of speakers using the language. Understanding, then, is not a
function of what goes on in the 'mind' at all, but a location of the hermeneutic
object in its linguistic situation. When I understand a language, I can go on
to continue the discourse. When I understand what other people say, I am
not required to have their mental images; and when they communicate
meaning they are not obliged to transfer to the listener the 'contents' of their
mind, nor any of the mental images and associations which may be aroused
by that language.

THE METONYMIC FUNCTION OF POST-COLONIAL LANGUAGE
Given the multiaccentuality of meaning which a Constitutive Graphonomy
uncovers, the question remains as to how the post-colonial text itself resists
the reincorporation of its discursive practice into an amorphous universal
textuality. As I have suggested, it does this by actually installing alterity and
absence in the interstices of the text. Whether written from monoglossic,
diglossic or polyglossic cultures, such writing uses language to signify
difference while employing a 'sameness' which allows it to be understood.
Such difference is signified by language 'variance', the part of the wider
cultural whole which appropriates the language of the centre while setting
itself apart.
One of the most interesting features of post-colonial literature is that kind
of writing which is informed by the linguistic principles of a first language,
70

adopted literary form. And it is this intersection of language which many
writers propose as the distinguishing feature of post-colonial literature. This
use of language is something for which the writer usually takes as evidence
(of both his or her ingenuity and ethnographic function) an insertion of the
'truth' of culture into the text by a process of metaphoric embodiment. But
quite simply, language variance is métonymie, a synechdocic index of cultural
difference which affirms the distance of cultures at the very moment in which
it proposes to bring them together.
The use of english inserts itself into a political discourse in post-colonial
writing, and the transcription of english variants of all kinds captures that
moment between the culture affirmed on the one hand as 'indigenous', or
'national', and that on the other as 'imperialist', colonialist, or 'metropolitan'.
In the play The Cord by the Malaysian writer K.S. Maniam the english variant
establishes itself in clear contradistinction to the 'standard' within the
dialogue itself.
MulMah: What are you saying? Speaking English?
Ratnam: The language you still think is full of pride. The language that makes you
a stiff white corpse Uke this!

Muûûah: But you're nothing. I'm still the boss here.
Ratnam: Everything happens naturally. Now the language is spoke like I can speak
it... I can speak real life English now.

Muihiah: You can do that all day to avoid work!
Ratnam: You nothing but stick. You nothing but stink.

Look all clean, inside all
thing dirty. Outside everything. Inside nothing. Taking-making.
Walking-talking. Why you insulting all time? Why you sit on me like
monkey with wet backside? ^^

There are two principles operating in this passage which are central to the
writing of all cross-cultural literature. On the one hand there is a repetition
of the general idea of the interdependence of language and identity - you
are the way you speak. This general idea includes the more specific
Malaysian and Singaporean debate about whether 'standard' English or local
variants should be spoken in the region. The language of power, the
language of the metropolitan centre is that of Muthiah, while the 'real life
English', the language variant of cultural fidelity, is the one spoken by
Ratnam.
But the other, more distinctive act of the cross-cultural text is to inscribe
difference and absence as a corollary of that identity. The articulation of two
quite opposed possibilities of speaking and therefore of political and cultural
identification outlines a cultural space between them which is left unfilled,
and which, indeed, locates the core of the cross-cultural text. This unbridged
and redolent gulf of silence remains the energising centre of post-colonial
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writing. It is undiluted and perfect because it exists beyond language, the
ultimate signifier of difference. This gap becomes itself the sign of a fracture
between different worlds, worlds which may be sharable in language, but
whose apartness - the difference of lifetimes of associations, traditions,
simple experiences, learned responses and conventional allusions - is
explicitly confirmed. In this way the integrity of the traditional
interpretation of the world is articulated by difference and located firmly
within its own 'world' of experience.
But the location of this aphasie cultural gulf in the text is made most often
and most strikingly by uses of language which we could call the 'devices of
otherness', the devices which appear specifically utilised to establish the
difference and uniqueness of the post-colonial text. Apart from direct
glossing in the text, either by explanation or parenthetic insertions, such
devices include syntactic fusion, in which the english prose is structured
according to the syntactic principles of a first language; neologisms (new
lexical forms in English which are informed by the semantic and
morphological exigencies of a mother tongue); the direct inclusion of
untranslated lexical items in the text; ethno-rhythmic prose which
constructs an english discourse according to the rhythm and texture of a
first language; and the transcription of dialect and language variants of many
different kinds, whether they come from diglossic, polydialectical or
monolingual communities.
At its extreme, as in the insertion of unglossed foreign language in the
text, such language use is a direct confrontation with the requirement of
meanability. Signifiers of alterity are not necessarily inaccessible; rather they
explicitly establish a distance between the writer and reader functions in the
text as a cultural gap. The gap of silence reaffirms the parameters of
meanability as cultural parameters, and the language use offers its own
hybridity as the sign of an absence which cannot be simply traversed by an
interpretation. It directly intercepts notions of 'infinite transmissability' to
protect its difference from the incorporating universalism of the centre.
In conclusion we can say that post-colonial theory offers a particular
insight into questions of literary ontology and hermeneutics. The postcolonial writing, by stressing the distance between the participants,
re-emphasises the constitutive nature of the meaning event and the complex
nature of the usage in which meaning is accomplished. But the most
interesting possibilities of this theory are provided by the way in which it
distances itself from the tendency of European theory to establish universal
laws and principles. Post-colonial writing questions assumptions about
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distances itself from the tendency of European tiieory to establish universal
laws and principles. Post-colonial writing questions assumptions about
meaning and its transmissability, and privileges the conception of writing as
a social act conceived within the fusion of culture and consciousness.
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